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CHINA’S ONE-CHILD POLICY: ILLEGAL 
CHILDREN AND THE FAMILY 
PLANNING LAW 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
How sad it is to be a woman! 
Nothing on earth is held so cheap. 
Boys stand leaning at the door 
Like gods fallen out of heaven. 
Their hearts brave the Four Oceans, 
The wind and dust of a thousand miles. 
No one is glad when a girl is born: 
By her the family sets no store.1 
u Xuan wrote these lines long ago, but little seems to 
have changed in the ensuing centuries to alter the infe-
rior status of Chinese women.  True, Chinese women no longer 
serve as concubines or bind their feet,2 but their births are often 
decried as catastrophes in a society where families are only 
permitted one child.3  Chi An, whose fight against China’s one-
child policy (OCP) was recounted by Steven Mosher, describes 
the circumstances surrounding her birth as dismal at best.4   
While her elder brother was ushered into the world with cere-
  
 1. Fu Xuan, reprinted in Cathy C. Cardillo, Violence Against Chinese 
Women: Defining the Cultural Role, 19 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 85, 87 (1997) (old 
Chinese poem). 
 2. Ann D. Jordan, Women’s Rights in the People’s Republic of China: Pa-
triarchal Wine Poured From a Socialist Bottle, J. CHINESE L., Vol. 8, No. 1, 
available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/chinalaw/backissues/issue81/jordan. 
html (last visited Oct. 22, 2004). 
 3. Mary H. Hansel, China’s One-Child Policy’s Effects on Women and the 
Paradox of Persecution and Trafficking, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 
369, 377 (2002) (explaining that couples are under intense pressure to produce 
a son, with mothers losing face if they give birth to a girl instead). 
 4. STEVEN W. MOSHER, A MOTHER’S ORDEAL: ONE WOMAN’S FIGHT AGAINST 
CHINA’S ONE CHILD POLICY 6 (1994). 
F 
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monial feasts that would leave her grandparents in debt for 
years, she says of her own birth, “[s]o uneventful was my com-
ing into the world that no one remembers the exact date on 
which it happened.”5    
This preference for sons, exacerbated by the OCP, has created 
widely skewed male-to-female population ratios in China;6 the 
result is a dire shortage of women, especially in rural areas, and 
a resurrection of the ancient practice of wife-buying.7  Although 
some women are trafficked in violation of international law,8 
Chinese women now actively participate in their own sale at 
bridal auctions where bride prices can reach 15,000 yuan 
($1,800).9  But China’s 1980 Marriage Law prohibiting the exac-
tion of monies or gifts for marriage makes these marriages ille-
gal.10  Therefore, the children of these unions, as well as those 
children born “out-of-plan,”11 have no legal identity.12  Conse-
  
 5. Id. 
 6. Hansel, supra note 3, at 377. 
 7. See Elizabeth Spahn, Shattered Jade, Broken Shoe: Foreign Economic 
Development and the Sexual Exploitation of Women in China, 50 ME. L. REV. 
255, 277–78 (arguing that economic reform combined with the OCP has cre-
ated a “massive modern resurgence in the sale of women and children”).  Wife-
buying includes not only bride prices agreed upon between families, but the 
internal trafficking of Chinese women.  Id. 
 8. Women are often brought into China, notably from Vietnam and Thai-
land, to be sold as brides or prostitutes.  According to Vietnam’s Ministry of 
Public Security, between 1991 and 1999 at least 22,000 women and children 
were illegally sent to China.  The real figure could be much higher.  Moreover, 
authorities from China’s Guangxi province reported that 80 percent of Viet-
namese women illegally residing there were victims of trafficking.  Protecting 
Children From Modern Day Slavery: UNICEF Calls for Intensified Efforts to 
Protect Children at Regional Conference on Human Trafficking, UNICEF Re-
port, at http://www.unicef.org.vn/traffick.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2004). 
 9. See, e.g., Peter Goff, Costly Women, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 5, 
2003, at 11 (noting that while the average bride price was approximately 
3,000 yuan ($360) a few years ago, the norm now is approximately 15,000  
yuan ($1,800)).  All conversions of Chinese yuan to American dollars reflect an 
exchange rate of $1 to 8.277 yuan, the rate current as of Nov. 13, 2003, and 
then rounded to the nearest $10 increment. 
 10. MARRIAGE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, English version 
(effective Jan. 1, 1981) [hereinafter MARRIAGE LAW], at http://www.isino 
law.com.  
 11. “Out of plan” refers to those births unauthorized by the state, either 
because the couple did not have a birth quota or had exceeded the number of 
children permitted by the OCP. 
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quently, China faces the burgeoning problem of a large floating 
population unable to qualify for basic government services such 
as education and health care.13 
This Note will explore the incidental effects of the OCP, spe-
cifically, the rapidly rising woman shortage and the growing 
practice of wife-buying in the context of conflicting legal goals.  
By prioritizing the OCP, China faces a dilemma.  It can either 
ignore the prohibitions against wife-buying in its Marriage Law 
and allow trafficking to continue, thus implicitly endorsing the 
discrimination of women, in opposition to its status as a party 
to the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women (CEDAW);14 or it can enforce the Mar-
riage Law’s prohibitions and produce an even larger class of 
unauthorized children, in violation of China’s commitment to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.15  
Part II of this Note explores the background of the OCP and 
the events leading to its codification.  In Part III, the Note ana-
lyzes the effects of the OCP, primarily on women and unauthor-
ized children.  Part IV explains China’s law in the context of the 
OCP, particularly the conflict between the OCP and statutes 
concerning marriage and the welfare of children.  Finally, Part 
V assesses the legal ramifications of the OCP, both in China 
and the international community. 
  
 12. Report on Implementation of CEDAW in the People’s Republic of China, 
Human Rights in China, at 78, Dec. 1998 [hereinafter Report on CEDAW], 
available at http://iso.hrichina.org/download_repository/A/cedaw%2098.doc. 
 13. Unfair Burdens: Impact of the Population Control Policies on the Hu-
man Rights of Women and Girls, Human Rights in China (1995) [hereinafter 
Unfair Burdens], at http//iso.hrichina.org/iso/article_id=371&subcategory_id 
=16. 
 14. Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
 15. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex 445 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (Article 2(2) states that 
“[s]tate parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is 
protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of 
status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal 
guardians, or family members.”). 
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II. BACKGROUND: THE ONE-CHILD POLICY 
A. History of the OCP 
China had a population of approximately 540 million people 
when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) took control in 
1949.16  Just three decades later, the population had exploded to 
more than 800 million.17  This population explosion came at the 
urging of Mao Ze-Dong, who referred to birth control as a bour-
geois plot to visit “bloodless genocide” upon the Chinese people.18  
Mao’s population policy, however, also reflected the need of the 
PRC’s agrarian society for more workers.19   
By the late 1970s, Chinese officials had determined that 
China’s arable land could no longer sustain its growing popula-
tion.20  With a population of 1.25 billion at the end of 1998,21 
China must provide for twenty-two percent of the world’s popu-
lation on only seven percent of the world’s arable land.22  The 
government first attempted to conquer the population problem 
with the “wan, xi, shao” campaign, or the “Later, Longer, 
  
 16. Gordon J. MacDonald, How Reliable Are Population Statistics From 
China?, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (1999), at 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/ChinaFood/argu/argu_01.htm.  See also 
FARHANA HAQUE RAHMAN, THE STATUS OF RURAL WOMEN IN CHINA 82 (Interna-
tional Fund for Agricultural Development 1995) (attributing the population 
boom to a declining mortality rate and increasing birth rate). 
 17. See MacDonald, supra note 16.  Despite low fertility levels in China 
now, this substantial population increase from the 1950s to the early 1970s is 
the driving force behind China’s population growth.  Population projections for 
China are very uncertain, however, with projections differing by as many as 
200 million people.  Id. 
 18. Lisa B. Gregory, Examining the Economic Component of China’s One-
Child Family Policy Under International Law: Your Money or Your Life, 6 J. 
CHINESE L. 45, 48 (1992).  Mao promoted his political ideology with the slogan: 
“The more babies the more glorious are their mothers.”  Xiaorong Li, License 
to Coerce: Violence Against Women, State Responsibility, and Legal Failures in 
China’s Family-Planning Program, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 145, 148 (1996). 
 19. See Gregory, supra note 18, at 48. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Xizhe Peng, Population Policy and Program in China: Challenge and 
Prospective, 35 TEX. INT’L L.J. 51 (2000). 
 22. Antoaneta Bezlova, China to Formalize One-Child Policy, ASIA TIMES, 
May 24, 2001 [hereinafter China to Formalize].  Despite China’s immense 
geographical size, a limited area is suitable for agriculture, which makes 
population growth and the ensuing pressure on arable land a very serious 
problem.  See RAHMAN, supra note 16, at 82. 
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Fewer” policy.23  The campaign ordered couples to wait until 
later in life to marry, to wait longer between births, and to cap 
the number of children per family at two.24    However, when 
population specialists determined that a two-child policy would 
not help them realize their goal of zero population growth by 
2000, the PRC abandoned the campaign and implemented the 
one-child policy.25   
Chinese officials have cited numerous reasons to justify the 
OCP, among them, declining health and living standards, par-
ticularly a lack of housing, food, and jobs for its people.26  The 
government has emphasized that compulsory population reduc-
tion is necessary and should be pursued even if the personal 
costs to families are high.27  Shen Gaoxing, director of the Edu-
cation Department of China’s State Family Planning Commis-
sion, claimed in 1984 that “[i]f we had adopted an appropriate 
policy during the 1950s and 1960s we would not have had to 
advocate a one-child-per-couple policy now.”28 
Although the OCP has been in effect since 1979,29 the PRC did 
not adopt a single coherent law to regulate family planning un-
  
 23. See Peng, supra note 21, at 52–53 (noting that the policy set the mini-
mum marriage age at twenty-five for males and twenty-three for females, 
promoted a two-child norm, and recommended a birth interval of four years). 
 24. See Rachel A. Bouman, China’s Attempt to Promote Domestic Adop-
tions: How Does China’s One-Child Policy Affect Recent Revisions in China’s 
Adoption Law and Measure Up to the Hague Convention?, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. 
91, 96 (2000).  
 25. Id. at 97, citing H. Yuan Tien, Redirection of the Chinese Family: 
Ramifications of Minimal Reproduction 3 (Working Paper No. 67, 1984) (ex-
plaining that with a two-child policy, China’s population would increase at a 
rate of nine to ten births per every one thousand people). 
 26. See Gregory, supra note 18, at 48.  See also Julian Baum, China Birth-
Control Policy: Controversial But Very Effective, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 
1, 1984, at 9.  
 27. See Li, supra note 18, at 150.  Population control has been cited as the 
most important step in the economic development of China, with the alterna-
tives being poverty, high infant mortality and malnutrition.  Id.  The govern-
ment used slogans such as “with two children you can afford a 14-inch TV, 
with one child you can afford a 21-inch TV” to encourage families to have 
fewer children.  Patrick Goodenough, China’s Gender Imbalance Stems From 
‘Family Planning’ Policy, CNS NEWS, Apr. 6, 2001 [hereinafter China’s Gender 
Imbalance], at http//cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=//Foreign 
Bureaus\\archive\\200104\\For20010406a.html.  
 28. Baum, supra note 26. 
 29. Report on CEDAW, supra note 12, at 78. 
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til recently.30  The adoption of the Law of the People’s Republic 
of China on the Population and Family Planning (Family Plan-
ning Law) essentially codified the OCP.31  While family planning 
regulations were included in other laws, notable among them 
the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China32 and the 
1980 Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China,33 their 
provisions are not specific.  For example, the 1980 Marriage 
Law finds that both a husband and wife have a duty to practice 
family planning, but does not set out any procedures for doing 
so.34  The minimum age requirement for marriage, a relic of the 
“wan, xi, shao” campaign contained in Article 6 of the Marriage 
Law, is another tool used by the government to control the 
population.35  The Family Planning Law, however, goes further 
and codifies the essential element of the OCP.  It states that 
each family may have only one child unless they satisfy the spe-
cial criteria for a second child established in other regulations.36 
B. Exceptions to the OCP 
Although China’s population control policy is known as the 
OCP, this is slightly misleading.  At first, the OCP was enacted 
  
 30. See Patrick T.C. Hui, Birth Control in China: Cultural, Gender, Socio-
economic and Legislative Perspectives in Light of CEDAW Standards, 32 
H.K.L.J. 187, 188 (2002). 
 31. Id. at 200. 
 32. CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, English version 
(effective Dec. 4, 1982) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION], at http://www.isino 
law.com.  Article 25 provides: “The state promotes family planning so that 
population growth may fit plans for economic and social development.”  Id. 
 33. See MARRIAGE LAW, supra note 10.  Article 2 provides: “A marriage 
system based on the free choice of partners, on monogamy and on equality 
between man and woman shall be applied.  The lawful rights and interests of 
women, children and old people shall be practised.  Family planning shall be 
practised.”  Id.  See also MARRIAGE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(REVISED), English version (effective Apr. 28, 2001) (retaining the same lan-
guage) [hereinafter MARRIAGE LAW (REVISED)], at http://www.isinolaw.com. 
 34. MARRIAGE LAW, supra note 10, art. 12. 
 35. Anthony M.W. Law & Alisa W.C. Kwan, Family Law, in CHINESE LAW 
423 (Wang Guiguo & John Mo eds., 1999).  See also MARRIAGE LAW (REVISED), 
supra note 33, art. 6 (providing: “No marriage may be contracted before the 
male party has reached 22 years of age and the female party 20 years of age.  
Late marriage and later childbirth shall be encouraged.”). 
 36. LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE POPULATION AND 
FAMILY PLANNING art. 18, English version (effective Sept. 1, 2002) [hereinafter 
FAMILY PLANNING LAW], at http://www.isinolaw.com. 
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uniformly throughout China; it has since been changed to ac-
commodate the concerns of rural farmers.37  In rural areas, the 
policy is often thought of as the one-son-or-two-child plan.38  If 
the first child is a girl, couples may apply for a second-birth 
permit; these permits usually cost approximately 4,000 yuan 
(US $500).39  This policy reflects both the needs of an agricul-
turally based society in which sons are critical for the continued 
livelihood of the family,40 and the beliefs of Chinese rural peas-
ants that they are dishonoring their ancestors if they do not 
extend the male line.41   
There are several other exceptions to the OCP.  Multiple 
births, such as twins or triplets, are usually not a violation of 
the policy.42  Moreover, when both parents have no siblings of 
their own or have just returned from living overseas, the gov-
ernment often permits them a second child as a reward.43  
Members of minority groups are usually permitted more than 
one child, although this policy varies by region and minority 
group.44  Finally, if a child is killed or dies of a non-genetic ill-
  
 37. See Bouman, supra note 24, at 97.   
 38. Chu Junhong, Prenatal Sex Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion 
in Rural Central China; Statistical Data Included, POPULATION & DEV. REV. 
No. 2, Vol. 27, at 259 (June 1, 2001).   
 39. Id. (noting that while couples are technically not allowed a second child 
if the first child is a boy, impoverished local governments will sometimes 
agree to officially register the second boy for approximately 12,000 yuan 
(US$1,500)). 
 40. Id. at 97. 
 41. See Nicholas D. Kristof, China’s Crackdown on Births: A Stunning, and 
Harsh, Success, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, at A1 [hereinafter China’s Crack-
down]. 
 42. See Heather M. Schmidt, The Cycle Created by China’s One-Child Pol-
icy, unpublished note (2002), at 8. 
 43. See Bezlova, China to Formalize, supra note 22. 
 44. See Gregory, supra note 18, at 53 (noting that non-Han Chinese, not 
under the auspices of the OCP until 1989, must now comply, but are usually 
permitted three or four children instead of only one).  Minority groups that 
inhabit sparsely populated regions may usually have as many children as they 
wish because of manpower needs.  Most Han Chinese are not willing to move 
to these areas, making population growth the only affordable or practical la-
bor source.  There are also religious reasons for allowing ethnic minorities, of 
which there are 55 different groups, to have more children.  See Schmidt, su-
pra note 42, at 8. 
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ness, couples are usually permitted another child.45  However, 
even if a second child is permitted, local governments typically 
require that couples wait five years before having the second 
child to diminish the woman’s fertile period and thus her ability 
to even conceive a second child.46 
C. Implementation of the OCP 
While enforcement of the OCP varies by region, national gov-
ernment directives and resolutions explicate implementation 
measures.47  First, couples must be married and must be issued 
birth permits prior to attempting to conceive a child.48  In some 
areas, couples may have to wait for years for the permission to 
conceive because of the number of couples planning to have ba-
bies within that community.49  After bearing the permitted 
number of children, women are required to wear an intrauter-
ine device (IUD) or be sterilized.50   While the policy initially 
called for either spouse to use “effective” and “long term” con-
traception after the birth of one child,51 the government tight-
ened restrictions in 1982, and required IUD insertion for 
women with one child.52  Women who proceed with unauthor-
ized pregnancies, especially after having the permitted number 
of children, are forced to terminate the pregnancy.53  Women 
may be required to undergo forcible abortion, even as late as the 
  
 45. See Goodenough, China’s Gender Imbalance, supra note 27 (noting that 
“sterilization, one of the principal forms of birth control, may also be per-
formed when parents suffer from alleged ‘genetic disorders,’ a practice justi-
fied by the eugenic objective of ‘improving the quality of the population.’”). 
 46. LITA LINZER SCHWARTZ & NATALIE K. ISSER, ENDANGERED CHILDREN: 
NEONATICIDE, INFANTICIDE, AND FILICIDE 26 (2000).  
 47. See Li, supra note 18, at 152. 
 48. Unfair Burdens, supra note 13.  See also Tara A. Gellman, The Blurred 
Line Between Aiding Progress and Sanctioning Abuse: United States Appro-
priations, the UNFPA and Family Planning in the P.R.C., 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. 
HUM. RTS. 1063, 1066 (2001) (a birth permit is also referred to as a “birth-
allowed certificate” or a “family-planning certificate”). 
 49. See Li, supra note 18, at 152. 
 50. Ann Noonan, One-Child Crackdown, NATIONAL REVIEW, Aug. 16, 2001, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-noonan081601 
.shtml.   
 51. See Li, supra note 18, at 153. 
 52. Michael Weisskopf, Abortion Policy Tears at China’s Society, 
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 7, 1985, at A1 [hereinafter Abortion Policy]. 
 53. See Unfair Burdens, supra note 13. 
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ninth month of pregnancy.54  Moreover, after unplanned births, 
one spouse must be sterilized.55  Between 1979 and 1984, 31 mil-
lion women and 9.3 million men were sterilized, totaling almost 
one-third of all married productive couples.56 
Despite the adoption of the national Family Planning Law, 
implementation and enforcement of the OCP is still carried out 
ad hoc by significantly different local regulations.57   Implemen-
tation has thus been a top-down process, with the central gov-
ernment placing serious restrictions on the intimate aspects of 
individuals’ lives.58   The OCP has been implemented by party 
directives, not the rule of law.59  Local authorities must enforce 
the policy and meet birth quotas set by the central government.  
Failure to meet quotas can result in demotion, salary reduction, 
and disciplinary sanctions for government officials.60   As Ann 
Noonan explains: 
This has led to the use of local informants to discover unau-
thorized pregnancies, monitoring women’s menses at the work 
  
 54. Noonan, supra note 50.  See also Weisskopf, Abortion Policy, supra note 
52 (noting that as late as the 1950s, abortion was criminally punishable as 
murder in China); Patrick Goodenough, China’s ‘One-Child Policy’ Results in 
Forced Abortions, Infanticide, CNS NEWS, Feb. 14, 2001 (stating that a 1999 
report by the International Planned Parenthood Foundation estimates that 
approximately 750,000 Chinese girls are aborted each year) [hereinafter 
China’s ‘One-Child Policy’], http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewPrint.asp?Page= 
\ForeignBureaus\archive\200102\For20010214c.html.  
 55. See Li, supra note 18, at 153.  See also Weisskopf, Abortion Policy, su-
pra note 52 (noting that sterilization is required for one member of every cou-
ple with two or more children). 
 56. See Weisskopf, Abortion Policy, supra note 52.  See also Kristof, China’s 
Crackdown, supra note 41 (stating that the proportion of couples sterilized or 
using contraception rose to 83.4% in 1992 from 71.1% in 1988); Unfair Bur-
dens, supra note 13 (Only 16.9 percent of sexually active men use any form of 
contraception at all, primarily because contraception use by men is considered 
insulting in China’s male-dominated society.  Consequently, men tend to be 
ignorant of reproductive issues, and consider abortion to be a method of con-
traception.). 
 57. J. CHEN, CHINESE LAW: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF CHINESE LAW, 
ITS NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT 262 (1999).  See also Zhang Xianchu, Family 
Law, in INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 320 (Wang Chenguang & Zhang Xian-
chu eds., 1997). 
 58. See Li, supra note 18, at 151.   
 59. Id. (explaining that government officials handle all aspects of imple-
menting the policy, including the meting out of punishments). 
 60. Id. at 152.   
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place, and the implementation of draconian measures which 
include violence against women, forcible late-term abortions, 
forced IUD insertion, forced sterilization, the detention of 
pregnant women or their family members, and destruction of 
“over-birth” families’ homes.61 
While each province and city is awarded an annual quota for 
births, local officials, including members of neighborhood com-
mittees and production units, are responsible for apportioning 
the number of births among their members.62  Work units and 
neighborhood committees decide not only how many children a 
family may have, but when they may have a child.63  Women 
who fail to receive birth quotas are often induced to abort, even 
if it is their first child.64    
D. Compliance With the OCP 
Compliance with the OCP is induced in a number of ways, 
and the consequences of noncompliance fall under several cate-
gories.65  In some areas, the OCP is strictly enforced and those 
in noncompliance are subject to the most severe penalties, while 
in other areas even national policies are not enforced.66  Penal-
ties openly imposed by the policy include fines, disqualifications 
for benefits, administrative demotion and dismissal from em-
ployment.67  These penalties differ significantly among regions.68  
  
 61. Noonan, supra note 50.   
 62. Gregory, supra note 18, at 52. 
 63. See, e.g., MOSHER, supra note 4, at 146 (noting that prior to marriage, 
couples are read the official policy on birth planning; a woman must receive a 
quota from her work unit before getting pregnant and must use contraception 
until receiving that quota). 
 64. Id. Chi An, as director of her work unit’s family planning clinic, took 
extensive measures to ensure that her work unit complied with the birth quo-
tas.  Women illegally pregnant were forced into isolated storerooms for family 
planning study sessions and kept there for days or even weeks until they “vol-
untarily” consented to an abortion.  Id. at 268–70. 
 65. See Li, supra note 18, at 154. 
 66. Id. at 154–55. 
 67. Id. at 154.  See, e.g., Tianjin Family Planning Regulations, reprinted in 
Forced Abortion and Sterilization in China: The View From the Inside: Hear-
ing Before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights 
of the House Committee on International Relations, 105th Cong. 2 (June 10, 
1998) [hereinafter Hearings].    
 68. James Kynge, China Steps Up Enforcement of 1-Child-Per-Family Law, 
L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1990, at A4.  
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For example, in Chongqing, a family with more than one child 
may face sanctions that include the deprivation of farmland or 
fines of up to three times the couple’s annual income; in Guang-
dong, however, fines for an extra child are considered a form of 
tax on the affluent or a matter of bribing the right people.69   In 
other regions, such as Fujian, the standard fine for children 
born outside family planning rules is twice a family’s gross an-
nual income, with additional unauthorized births incurring 
fines assessed in increments of 50 percent of annual income per 
child.  In Guangzhou, a fine may be 30 to 50 percent of an aver-
age resident’s income over a seven-year period.70 
Another form of inducement includes police-sanctioned psy-
chological intimidation, mandatory study sessions, visits by au-
thorities and menstrual cycle monitoring.71  The Chinese gov-
ernment claims that its family planning policy “combines gov-
ernment guidance with the voluntary participation of the peo-
ple,”72 yet Steven Mosher provides a chilling account of volun-
tary compliance: 
There are cases in China where brute force is used to perform 
abortion and sterilization.  But more commonly, the Chinese 
government abides by its own Orwellian definition of volun-
tary, which is to say that you can fine the woman; you can lock 
her up; you can subject her to morning-to-night brainwashing 
sessions; you can cut off the electricity to her house; you can 
fire her from her job; you can fire her husband from his job; 
and you can fire her parents from their jobs.  All of this psy-
chological mauling, sleep deprivation, arrest, and grueling 
mistreatment is inflicted upon these women in order to break 
their will to resist.  But as long as the pregnant women walk 
the last few steps to the local medical clinic under their own 
  
 69. Gregory, supra note 18, at 53–54.  See also Elisabeth Rosenthal, Rural 
Flouting  of One-Child Policy Undercuts China’s Census, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 
2000, at A8 (noting that fines have not been the most effective means of pre-
venting illegal births) [hereinafter Rural Flouting of One-Child Policy]; Paula 
Abrams, Population Politics: Reproductive Rights and U.S. Asylum Policy, 14 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 881, 901 (2000).  
 70. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor, China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997 (Jan. 30, 
1998) [hereinafter China Country Report], http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ 
ea/uschina/rights97.htm. 
 71. See Li, supra note 18, at 154.  See also Hansel, supra note 3, at 373. 
 72. See Gerrie Zhang, U.S. Asylum Policy and Population Control in the 
People’s Republic of China, HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 557, 566 (1996).  
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power, then the abortions that follow are said to be “volun-
tary.”73 
The national government gives local officials great autonomy in 
its methods of persuasion.74  As Shen Guoxiang, director of the 
State Family Planning Commission in 1990, noted, “Normally 
the women are willing to abort.  But if they are not, then the 
local cadres come ‘round to persuade them a little.’”75   
A final tactic to induce compliance involves the use of force by 
government agents, and often includes physical brutality, prop-
erty destruction, detention, beatings and demolition of resi-
dences.76  In some areas, terrorizing women and their families 
has become routine for population control officials.77  For exam-
ple, local officials often collapse the houses of women who refuse 
to abort their unauthorized children; in one village, officials 
pulled down the houses of six women pregnant with their sec-
ond or later child and forbid other families in the village from 
providing them with shelter.78  Chinese women and their fami-
lies have little to no recourse against local officials and there is 
no evidence of prosecutions of local officials who have abused 
their authority.79   
  
 73. See Scott Weinberg, An End to the One-Child Quota?, Feb. 2000 (quot-
ing Steven Mosher, of the Population Research Institute, speaking at a con-
ference on human rights in China), available at http://www.catholic.net 
/rcc/Periodicals/cwr/Feb2000/Dossier3.html. 
 74. See Kynge, supra note 68. 
 75. Id.  
 76. See Li, supra note 18, at 158.  See also Hansel, supra note 3, at 373 
(noting that violence is used most often in cases of extreme policy violations; 
for example, government officials blew up the home of a family with three 
children). 
 77. See Unfair Burdens, supra note 13 (explaining that because national 
law does not prohibit any specific enforcement measures as cruel or illegiti-
mate, local authorities have the implicit power to use any means they wish). 
 78. Liu Yin, China’s Wanted Children; They Come for Unborn Babies in the 
Dead of the Night.  Liu Yin Witnesses Peking’s Brutal Attempts to Control 
Soaring Rural Birth Rates, INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 11, 1991, at 25. 
 79. Unfair Burdens, supra note 13. 
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III. EFFECTS OF THE OCP ON WOMEN 
A. Positive Impact on Population Growth  
Thus far, the OCP has been fairly effective at achieving the 
PRC’s main objective: the reduction of the birth rate.80  Chinese 
officials claim that the OCP has prevented 330 million births in 
the past three decades.81  Moreover, because of China’s large 
population, the OCP has played a significant role in reducing 
worldwide population growth; the average growth rate in Asia, 
excluding China, was 0.3 percent higher than China’s between 
1980 and 1990.82  According to the government, the OCP has 
reduced the average number of children per woman in China 
from 5.8 in 1970 to 1.8 today.83  Many demographers, however, 
place the rate closer to 2.1, while some estimate that it is as 
high as 2.6 children per woman.84  Despite the demographic dis-
crepancies, the PRC attributes nationwide gains to the OCP, 
among them a 35 percent rise in China’s GDP since 1995, in-
creased grain output sufficient to allow China to feed its own 
population, lower mortality rates and improved educational op-
portunities.85 
Nevertheless, the government is concerned with reports from 
the 2000 census indicating that rural couples are not complying 
with the OCP.86  While China’s census office adjusted its raw 
figures somewhat to account for unregistered children,87 unan-
nounced spot checks by China’s State Statistics Bureau indicate 
that the Census has undercounted by up to 40 percent in some 
  
 80. Hansel, supra note 3, at 376. 
 81. Bezlova, China to Formalize, supra note 22. 
 82. Peng, supra note 21, at 62. 
 83. Rosenthal, Rural Flouting of One-Child Policy, supra note 69. 
 84. U.S. Embassy, Beijing, P.R.C., available at http://www.usembassy-
china.org/cn/englsh/sandt/fertl21.htm (Oct. 1997).  Demographers consider 2.1 
children per woman to be the replacement rate, the rate at which a population 
must reproduce to maintain it population size.  Id.   
 85. China Holds Back Population Growth, XINHUA ECON. NEWS SERVICE, 
Mar. 7, 2001. 
 86. Noonan, supra note 50. 
 87. Unregistered children are those children born outside the system.  
Families who have more than one child will often attempt to hide those chil-
dren from the government.  The result is an uncounted floating population 
ineligible for state benefits such as education and health care.  See generally 
Report on CEDAW, supra note 12. 
File: Skalla.122704.doc Created on:  12/27/2004 2:04 PM Last Printed: 12/27/2004 2:05 PM 
342 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 30:1 
villages.88   The PRC remains optimistic about the OCP and its 
results,89 however, and even claims that “the idea of family 
planning and the importance of reproductive health have been 
widely accepted by the public.”90 
B. Negative Consequences 
The OCP, however, has engendered a myriad of negative con-
sequences, notably the rise of sex discrimination against women 
and its contingent repercussions.91  Men vastly outnumber 
women in China; there are 60 million more men than women in 
China today.92  Female babies are considered expendable,93 and 
sex-selective abortions and infanticides have become common-
place solutions for eliminating unwanted girl children.94  Many 
girls who survive selection are abandoned to orphanages,95 sold 
on the baby black market,96 or endure second-class lives, where 
  
 88. Rosenthal, Rural Flouting of One-Child Policy, supra note 69. 
 89. See China Holds Back Population Growth, supra note 85 (noting that 
China has successfully held population growth to the natural rate of one per-
cent in the past five years). 
 90. Bezlova, China to Formalize, supra note 22 (statement by Shi Chun-
jing, vice director of the Regulation Department of the State Family Planning 
Commission, in support of the Family Planning Law). 
 91. Hansel, supra note 3, at 376.  See also Michael Weisskopf, China’s 
Birth Control Policy Drives Some to Kill Baby Girls, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 
8, 1985, at A1 (Women absorb the blame when the child is female, often find-
ing themselves subject to beatings, the scorn of their families and divorce.  
The pressure on women to produce a son has reportedly driven women to sui-
cide or mental institutions.) [hereinafter Drives Some to Kill Baby Girls]; 
Penny Kane & Ching Y. Choi, China’s One Child Family Policy, BRIT. MED. J. 
(1999) (noting that China has one of the highest suicide rates in the world for 
women in their reproductive years).  
 92. Goodenough, China’s ‘One-Child Policy,’ supra note 54. 
 93. See Kane & Choi, supra note 91. 
 94. See Goodenough, China’s ‘One-Child Policy,’ supra note 54. 
 95. DEATH BY DEFAULT: A POLICY OF FATAL NEGLECT IN CHINA’S STATE 
ORPHANAGES 2–3, Human Rights Watch (1996) (noting that the vast majority 
of children in orphanages have consistently been healthy infant girls) 
[hereinafter DEATH BY DEFAULT]. 
 96. Hannah Beech Xicheng, China’s Infant Cash Crop, TIME PAC., Jan. 29, 
2001 (While some women are selling their extra children because they violate 
the OCP, other women, often from extremely impoverished villages, have be-
come full-time baby machines, rationalizing that it is cheaper to raise babies 
for sale than pigs.), available at http://www.time.com/time/pacific/magazine 
/20010129/china.html. 
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they are concealed from the government because their parents 
did not register them.97  Ironically, the abduction and trafficking 
of Chinese women is rapidly increasing as men, especially in 
rural areas, attempt to accommodate for the shortage of wives 
and mothers created by their discrimination against female 
children.98 
C. China’s Preference for Male Children 
Confucian tenets largely defined a woman’s status in the tra-
ditional Chinese social structure.99  Every woman grew up 
knowing the four virtues:  
[F]irst, a woman should know her place in the universe and 
behave in compliance with the natural order of things; second, 
she should guard her words and not chatter too much or bore 
others; third, she must be clea[n] and adorn herself to please 
men; and fourth, she should not shirk from her household du-
ties.100 
The traditional Chinese marriage was preeminently a contract 
and the most common means of recruiting female labor into 
families.101  Wives were bought and sold in the market for pro-
ductive and reproductive labor.  While bridegrooms’ families 
occasionally paid dowries, the bride price was the predominant 
economic feature of the marriage and reflected the net gain to 
the husband’s family in obtaining the bride’s labor.102   A daugh-
ter was often considered an outsider from the moment of her 
birth.103  Because she would no longer bring economic benefit to 
her own family once she was given to her husband’s family, a 
daughter was “like spilled water.”104 
  
 97. See Abrams, supra note 69. 
 98. Hansel, supra note 3, at 377.  See also Kane & Choi, supra note 91. 
 99. Cardillo, supra note 1, at 88. 
 100. See Paula C. Johnson, The Social Construction of Identity in Criminal 
Cases: Cinema Verite and the Pedagogy of Vincent Chin, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
347, 378–79 (1996).   
 101. Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Compara-
tive Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1599, 1642–43 (2000). 
 102. Id.  
 103. Cardillo, supra note 1, at 88. 
 104. Id. 
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When the Communist government took control of China in 
1949, however, the status of women seemed poised for a change.   
The PRC worked to establish women as equals, both legally105 
and by making them part of the class struggle under the slogan, 
“women hold up half the sky.”106  The education and propaganda 
campaigns of the new Communist regime had an effect, and 
skewed sex ratios improved between 1949 and 1970.107  As Ju-
dith Banister, a social science professor at Hong Kong Univer-
sity of Science and Technology, noted, “Mao, for all his failings, 
did say that ‘women hold up half the sky,’ … and it did have an 
impact.  The attack on the patriarchal family was very strong 
and very effective.”108 
Women did not hold up half the sky for long.  When severe 
economic hardships shattered much of Mao’s ideology in the 
1960s and early 1970s, the OCP was adopted to counter over-
population, famine and poverty.109  With the aid of modern tech-
nology, namely ultrasound machines, many Chinese reverted to 
traditional practices, promoting the birth of sons over daugh-
ters.110  While Confucian ideology does play a role in son prefer-
ence, the concerns of parents for their economic futures is also 
determinative.111  When Mao was alive and in power, those 
working in state-owned industries could depend on the “iron 
rice bowl”112 to provide for them in their old age, but his death 
  
 105. The Constitution provides:  “Women in the People’s Republic of China 
enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life, in political, economic, cul-
tural, social and family life.”  CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, art. 48.  See also 
Anna M. Han, Holding Up More Than Half the Sky: Marketization and the 
Status of Women in China, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 791, 798 (2001) (not-
ing that the 1950 Marriage Law, although largely unknown, attempted to 
address inequalities between men and women). 
 106. See Margaret Y.K. Woo, Biology and Equality: Challenge for Feminism 
in the Socialist and Liberal State, 42 EMORY L.J. 143, 147–48 (1993).   
 107. Henry Chu, In China, 7 Brides for 14 Brothers; A Male-Centered Tradi-
tion and a ‘One-Child’ Policy Have Created a Huge Demographic Imbalance.  
Trafficking in Women Is a Brisk Business, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2001, at A1. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Cardillo, supra note 1, at 89. 
 110. Rosenthal, Rural Flouting of One-Child Policy, supra note 69. 
 111. Cardillo, supra note 1, at 90. 
 112. See Woo, supra note 106, at 150.  The “iron rice bowl” is a metaphor for 
the Chinese social security system created to provide food and shelter for all 
Chinese citizens from womb to tomb.  Benefits included subsidized medical 
care, housing, education and a pension upon retirement.  Id. 
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and the decline of those industries destroyed that security.113  
Article 49 of China’s Constitution requires that “children who 
have come of age…support and assist their parents.”114  Chinese 
courts have expansively interpreted the duty of support to in-
clude not only financial assistance, but also the personal care 
and spiritual comfort of a parent.115  Although Chinese law is 
gender neutral with regard to support duties, i.e., women have 
the same obligation as men to provide for their parents, the re-
ality is far different.  First, seventy percent of the jobs targeted 
for elimination in antiquated state-owned industries were held 
by women.116  In many cases, women simply do not have the 
economic means to support a family.117  Second, women typically 
“belong” to the family they marry into, meaning that they could 
not care for the elders in their birth family or work in the family 
business.118  Sons, on the other hand, “come with a lifetime 
guarantee of security.  They will work in the fields, support eld-
erly parents and carry on the family line.”119  These cultural as-
  
 113. See James Walsh, Born to Be Second Class; in China, Old Biases 
Against Women Have Emerged Once Again, TIME, Sept. 11, 1995, at 46. 
 114. CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, art. 49. 
 115. Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?: 
The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 77, 100 (1998).  The Constitu-
tion and the Marriage Law provide that “the following family members have 
duties of support: (1) spouses, (2) parents and children (including natural, 
adoptive, and stepparents and stepchildren), (3) grandparents and grandchil-
dren (if the grandchildren’s parents are deceased), and (4) siblings (if their 
parents are dead or destitute).”  Id. at 97. 
 116. See id.  See also Woo, supra note 106, at 151–52.  While women consti-
tuted 38 percent of the labor force in the 1980s, China’s focus on privatization 
and economic efficiency during the 1990s has made unemployment a serious 
problem, with women bearing the brunt of it.  Moreover, women have typically 
been segregated into light industries, such as service, textile and food process-
ing, making their normal earnings less than that of men.  Id. 
 117. NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WUDUNN, CHINA WAKES 216 (1994) 
(While women may have greater economic opportunities today, they encounter 
greater discrimination.  Most jobs available to women “are on assembly lines 
in the noisiest, dirtiest industries.”).   
 118. Hansel, supra note 3, at 378.  See also Woo, supra note 106, at 153 
(noting that women “bear the double burden of home and work”).  But see 
Peng, supra note 21, at 59 (arguing that the responsibility for the elderly falls 
on women, thus preventing them from working outside the home). 
 119. Disappearing Girls; In China and South Korea, a Gender Gap Causes 
Worries, ASIAWEEK, Mar. 3, 1995, at 32 [hereinafter Disappearing Girls].  Ac-
cording to Confucius, the failure to carry on the family line was the way to 
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sumptions, compounded with economic disenfranchisement and 
magnified by the OCP, continue to oppress Chinese women and 
are the leading cause of sex-selective practices in China.120 
D. Sex-Selective Abortion, Female Infanticide, 
 and Abandonment 
Millions of girls, some five percent of female babies that 
should be born every year, are considered missing,121 victims of 
sex-selective abortion, female infanticide, abandonment, and 
non-registration.122  As many as 15 million babies have disap-
peared since the introduction of the OCP.123  Sex-selective abor-
tions, often voluntarily sought by couples, have become ex-
tremely common.124  Although the PRC has outlawed sex-
selective abortions,125 the State Statistical Bureau acknowledged 
in a 1996 report that the practice was still common in rural ar-
eas.126  In 1999, the International Planned Parenthood Federa-
tion estimated that, after gender screening, 500,000 to 750,000 
Chinese girls are aborted annually.127  Regulations and laws 
have been ineffective thus far in enforcing the ban on prenatal 
sex-selection because the root cause of prenatal sex-selection—
son preference—persists.128  The ubiquity of ultrasound technol-
  
show the greatest disloyalty to ancestors.  Weisskopf, Drives Some to Kill 
Baby Girls, supra note 91. 
 120. Hansel, supra note 3, at 378. 
 121. “Missing,” as used here, means that these women are missing from 
China’s population, either because they were never born (sex-selective abor-
tion), were killed during their infancy, or are unregistered and thus not in-
cluded in the Census. 
 122. Caught Between Tradition and the State: Violations of the Human 
Rights of Chinese Women, Human Rights in China, Fall 1995, at 
http://iso.hrichina.org/iso/article.adp?article_id=369&subcategory_id=16.  
 123. Sofianni Subki, Open Arms for Daughters Too, NEW STRAIT TIMES, Apr. 
21, 2003, at 1.  
 124. Id. at 379. 
 125. Report on CEDAW, supra note 12, at 88.  Prenatal sex selection was 
outlawed in 1986 by the Ministry and Health and the State Family Planning 
Commission with the Notice on Forbidding Prenatal Sex Determination.  
Junhong, supra note 38, at 2. 
 126. Xiao Yu, Young Women Threaten Plan to Control Numbers, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Oct. 9, 1996, at 10. 
 127. See Goodenough, China’s Gender Imbalance, supra note 27. 
 128. Junhong, supra note 38, at 3. 
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ogy129 and the readiness of physicians to violate the law to en-
gage in the lucrative sex-determination trade make enforce-
ment extremely difficult, especially when officials are willing to 
look the other way.130 
Infanticide is a criminal offense but, despite the continued 
practice, prosecutions are extremely unusual.131  Abandonment, 
also a criminal offense,132 surged in the 1980s, primarily because 
of the OCP.133  Ninety-five percent of children in orphanages are 
healthy infant girls.134  Placement in an orphanage, however, 
does not guarantee life.135  Most children die shortly after ad-
mission into an orphanage, primarily from neglect, starvation, 
and exposure.136  For example, in the Nanning orphanage in 
Guangxi province, staff and regular visitors “freely admitted 
that 90 percent of the 50 to 60 baby girls who arrived at the or-
phanage each month would end their lives there.”137  Moreover, 
most abandoned children do not even make it to an orphanage, 
  
 129. Jodi Danis, Recent Development: Sexism and “The Superfluous Fe-
male”: Arguments For Regulating Pre-Implantation Sex Selection, 18 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 219, 234–35 (1995) (noting that “many sociologists and obstetric 
practitioners acknowledge that widespread use of the technology may create a 
demographic sex imbalance favoring males”). 
 130. See Junhong, supra note 38, at 3 (observing that private connections 
and bribing make regulations against prenatal sex determination impossible 
to enforce). 
 131. Report on CEDAW, supra note 12, at 88.  See also Li, supra note 18, at 
116 (The large discrepancy between male and female babies cannot be ex-
plained solely by aborted female fetuses and concealed girl children.  This 
leads some to conclude that female infanticide is not a rare phenomenon, but 
a factual reality.). 
 132. China Country Report, supra note 70 (noting that abandonment is pun-
ishable by fines and a five-year prison term). 
 133. DEATH BY DEFAULT, supra note 95, at 2–3. 
 134. Hansel, supra note 3, at 381. 
 135. See Tom Hilditch, A Holocaust of Girls¸ S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 
1995, at 39, reprinted in WORLD PRESS REVIEW (explaining that orphanage 
deaths tend to be the product of “sheer neglect”), available at 
http://acc6.its.brooklyn.cuny.edu/~phalsall/texts/c-wnhol.html.  See also 
DEATH BY DEFAULT, supra note 95, at 3 (commenting that “[m]any institu-
tions…appeared to be operating as little more than assembly lines for the 
elimination of unwanted orphans, with an annual turnover of admissions and 
deaths far exceeding the number of beds available”). 
 136. See generally DEATH BY DEFAULT, supra note 95. 
 137. Hilditch, supra note 135 (noting that the conditions at the Nanning 
orphanage are by no means exclusive to that orphanage, but are prevalent 
elsewhere).  
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but are placed in general-purpose institutions with even higher 
mortality rates.138  Despite these problems, however, a 1991 re-
port by the Hunan Civil Affairs Bureau did not find a single 
successful case of prosecution for abandonment.139  Moreover, 
the Chinese government has shown itself to be unwilling to 
tackle the problem.  In its initial report to the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, the government stated that Chinese law 
only considers abandonment a crime “where the circumstances 
are grave enough.”140 
E. Woman Shortage 
The Chinese cultural preference for boys, exacerbated by the 
OCP, is largely responsible for an alarming increase in the ratio 
of boys to girls,141 arousing the concerns of both policymakers 
and scholars in China.142  While statistics vary widely,143 a 1995 
mini-census by the Chinese government recorded a ratio of 118 
boys to every 100 girls.144  Considering that the worldwide bio-
logical norm is 106 males for every 100 females, China has a 
serious gender gap.145   In some rural areas, a study has indi-
cated that the sex ratio at birth was 125.9 males to 100 females, 
while the sex composition for all living children was 126.1 boys 
to 100 girls.146  Generally, this skewed sex ratio can be attrib-
uted to three factors:  (1) unregistered female births, (2) excess 
  
 138. DEATH BY DEFAULT, supra note 95, at 3.  Only two-fifths of China’s in-
stitutionalized orphans are placed in “child welfare institutes;” the rest are 
held in all-purpose “social-welfare institutes” where the inmates include eld-
erly, mentally ill, severely retarded and physically disabled individuals.  Id. at 
79. 
 139. Report on CEDAW, supra note 12, at 89. 
 140. Id. (noting that the government is reluctant to enforce regulations 
against child abandonment because it is seen as implicit criticism of the OCP). 
 141. Rosenthal, Rural Flouting of One-Child Policy, supra note 69. 
 142. Junhong, supra note 38, at 1. 
 143. One study indicated that ratios were skewed as high as 131 males to 
100 females.  See Graham Hutchings, Female Infanticide in China ‘Will Lead 
to Army of Bachelors,’ LONDON TELEGRAPH REP., available at 
http://www.reagan.com/HotTopics.main?HotMike/document-4.11.1997.6.html.   
 144. Chu, supra note 107. 
 145. Disappearing Girls, supra note 119.  The natural, biological gender gap 
tends to even out by age 20, as males typically have a higher casualty rate 
than females.  Id. 
 146. Junhong, supra note 38, at 5 (explaining that the differences in ratios 
reflects the practice of bearing children until a son arrives). 
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female infant mortality, and (3) heightened prenatal sex-
selective abortion of female fetuses.147  However, a survey of ru-
ral communities conducted by Chu Junhong found that prenatal 
sex determination was the primary cause of the rising sex ra-
tio.148 
This gender gap translates into a severe woman shortage.149  
There are now almost 100 million more men than women in 
China.150  Meanwhile, 400,000 to 500,000 more boys than girls 
are born annually.151  Unmarried men outnumber unmarried 
women by three to one,152 and some estimate that China has 
close to 70 million bachelors who will never wed.153  The surplus 
of single men from ages 20 to 44 is about 26 million now, 
enough to displace the populations of Arizona and Texas.154 
Optimists have predicted that the gender gap will lead to an 
improved social status for women.155  Historically, however, 
when gender discrimination produced similar, albeit much less 
worrisome, women shortages in China, the status of Chinese 
women did not improve.156  Even these optimists concede that 
the imbalance is also likely to lead to an increase in rape and 
prostitution, thus mitigating any slight improvements Chinese 
women might gain.157  Indeed, women in societies with large 
gender gaps tend to experience a variety of negative conse-
quences.158   As Scott Smith and Katherine Trent explain: 
  
 147. Id. at 1. 
 148. Id. at 2. 
 149. Hansel, supra note 3, at 383. 
 150. Calum Macleod, Life Begins Again For Chinese Girl Sold as Slave at 
12, INDEPENDENT (London), May 17, 2000, at 14 [hereinafter Life Begins 
Again]. 
 151. Disappearing Girls, supra note 119. 
 152. Maureen Freely, Freely Speech: Lives, Damned Lives and Statistics, 
GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 19, 1994, at T5 (noting that for singles over thirty 
years of age, unmarried men outnumber unmarried women by thirty to one). 
 153. Disappearing Girls, supra note 119.  See also VALERIE M. HUDSON & 
ANDREA M. DEN BOER, BARE BRANCHES: THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF ASIA’S 
SURPLUS MALE POPULATION 179–81 (2004) (noting that some sources suggest 
that China may already have as many as ninety million bachelors). 
 154. Hansel, supra note 3, at 383.   
 155. Freely, supra note 152. 
 156. Junhong, supra note 38, at 11. 
 157. Id. 
 158. HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 153, at 202–03 (noting that it seems 
counterintuitive that women’s social status would decline “as laws of supply 
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It is somewhat paradoxical that the increased “valuation” of 
women that accompanies high sex ratios severely limits their 
life options.  Our results suggest that an undersupply of 
women, combined with men’s overwhelming structural power, 
leads to high marriage and fertility rates and low rates of di-
vorce and illegitimacy.  But high sex ratios also serve to de-
limit and constrain the roles women occupy.  Hence, where 
women are in short supply, their levels of literacy and labor-
force participation are low, both relative to men in their own 
society and to women in low-sex-ratio societies.  Their suicide 
rate, relative to men’s, is also high.  It would appear, then, 
given the current distribution of structural power, the relative 
undersupply of females entails few benefits and many costs to 
women.159 
Although no one is certain how the woman shortage will im-
pact China,160 commentators argue that the gender gap will cre-
ate social calamity “in a culture where getting married and hav-
ing children is still a must—an act of filial duty.”161  These sur-
plus young bachelors are referred to as “guang gun-er,” or bare 
branches, in China;162 the fear is that this frustrated “army of 
bachelors” could create serious social perils and instability.163  
According to evolutionary psychologist Robert Wright,  
  
and demand would suggest that . . . the relative scarcity of women would in-
crease their value and thus make them more powerful”). 
 159. Id. at 203.  Women in high-sex-ratio societies are more likely to be 
kidnapped or sold.  Additionally, the age of female consent tends to drop, 
meaning that girls are married when they are very young; in some cases, be-
fore menarche.  Id. at 203–04.  
 160. Junhong, supra note 38, at 11.  See also Hansel, supra note 3, at 383–
84 (commenting that recently, Chinese male immigrants have unsuccessfully 
attempted to lodge asylum claims in Western countries, claiming refugee 
status based on an inability to marry and reproduce).   
 161. Chu, supra note 107. 
 162. HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 153, at 187–88.  One Chinese citizen 
explained:  
This is a metaphor, which indicates that the unmarried men have 
nothing attached, just like bare branches.  Bare branches give people 
an impression of bleakness and loneliness.  It is quite similar to the 
lives of the unmarried men.  They have no warm families, which can 
give them support and comfort; they have no children, who can take 
care of them when they become old. 
Id. 
 163. Chu, supra note 107. 
File: Skalla.122704.doc Created on: 12/27/2004 2:04 PM Last Printed: 12/27/2004 2:05 PM 
2004] CHINA'S ONE-CHILD POLICY 351 
Womenless men ...compete with special ferocity.  An unmar-
ried man between twenty-four and thirty-five years of age is 
about three times as likely to murder another male as is a 
married man the same age.  Some of this difference no doubt 
reflects the kind of men that do and don’t get married to begin 
with, but ... a good part of the difference may lie in “the pacify-
ing effect” of marriage.  Murder isn’t the only thing an “un-
pacified” man is more likely to do.  He is also more likely to in-
cur various risks—committing robbery, for example—to gain 
the resources that may attract women.  He is more likely to 
rape.164  
In fact, woman shortages have led to instability in the past: 
Mao’s Communist revolution gained the support of poor young 
men by promising to find them wives.165 
F. Trafficking of Women 
The dearth of available women has already created a more 
immediate problem: the abduction and trafficking of women.166  
Trafficking usually involves the abduction, displacement and 
sale (or trade) of women.167  Increasingly, women in China are 
kidnapped and sold into marriage to men desperate for wives,168 
primarily because “the demand by men for marriageable women 
cannot be met by local brides.”169   While economics may drive 
many peasant families to buy from a trafficker because it is 
cheaper to buy a wife than to pay a bride price,170 the result is 
the same: women have become “tradable commodities.”171   
Often, women are lured away from their homes and families 
with false promises of employment.172  Others are forcibly kid-
  
 164. ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL, WHY WE ARE THE WAY WE ARE: 
THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 100 (1994). 
 165. Chu, supra note 107. 
 166. Hansel, supra note 3, at 384.  See also China Country Report, supra 
note 70 (noting that “a key reason for the abduction and sale of women is a 
serious imbalance in sex ratios in certain localities”). 
 167. See, e.g., Chu, supra note 107. 
 168. Junhong, supra note 38, at 11.  See also Chu, supra note 107. 
 169. China Country Report, supra note 70. 
 170. Calum Macleod, Life Begins Again, supra note 150 (noting that buying 
a wife costs approximately 3,000 yuan, while bride prices usually exceed 
10,000 yuan).   
 171. KRISTOF & WUDUNN, supra note 117, at 216. 
 172. Chu, supra note 107. 
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napped.173  Once they reach their destination, these women are 
sold as wives, usually to farmers in the hinterlands.174  Even 
babies have been brought into the cycle; traffickers have been 
arrested while selling baby girls to be reared as child brides for 
rural farmers.175   
Even though trafficking is illegal in China,176 the trade 
thrives, reflecting both the gender gap and the extremely low 
status of rural women.177  In the past few years, China has 
stepped up its efforts to halt the trade and demonstrated its 
commitment with highly publicized arrests,178 death sentences179 
and rescues.180  Despite the national campaign to combat the 
trafficking of women and children,181 however, conservative es-
timates of abducted women run into the tens of thousands each 
year.182  Perhaps even more worrisome is that the publicity sur-
  
 173. Dorinda Elliot, Trying to Stand on Two Feet, NEWSWEEK, June 29, 
1998, at 48. 
 174. Chu, supra note 107. 
 175. Elizabeth Rosenthal, Bias for Boys Leads to Sale of Baby Girls in 
China, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2003, at 6.  See also HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra 
note 153, at 205. 
 176. Law Safeguarding Women’s Rights and Interests, Criminal Law Article 
141, English version, at http://www.isinolaw.com.  
 177. Rosenthal, Harsh Chinese Realities Feed Market in Women, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 25, 2001, at A8 [hereinafter Harsh Chinese Realities]. 
 178. See, e.g., John Schauble, Child Bride Reveals China’s Shame, AGE 
(Melbourne), Apr. 7, 2000, at 10 (telling the story of the liberation of Kang 
Minge, along with her one-year-old son, from life as a kidnapped child bride 
after two years, from age twelve to fourteen, as the wife of a farmer). 
 179. John Pomfret, China Cracks Down on Abductions of Women, Kids, 
WASHINGTON POST, May 11, 2000, at A23 (noting that thus far eight human 
traffickers have been executed). 
 180. Rosenthal, Harsh Chinese Realities, supra note 177.  See also Elliot, 
supra note 173 (commenting that while the Chinese police arrested 143,000 
people for participation in the slave trade and freed 88,000 kidnapped women 
and children between 1991 and 1996, brides often participate voluntarily); 
Pomfret, supra note 179 (noting that 10,000 kidnapping victims were freed in 
a five week period, demonstrating both the alarming growth in abductions as 
well as China’s renewed commitment to halt the trade). 
 181. Trafficking in Persons Report, U.S. Dept. of State, June 2003 (stating 
that, while the PRC does not fully comply with the minimum requirements for 
the elimination of trafficking, it is making significant efforts to do so, notably 
through public awareness campaigns against domestic bride abuses). 
 182. Macleod, Life Begins Again, supra note 150.  See also Spahn, supra 
note 7, at n.116 (noting that between 1980 and 1990, in Anhui province there 
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rounding the government’s efforts against trafficking does not 
reflect reality.183  Despite its claims, the government has failed 
to initiate a comprehensive campaign of arrests and prosecu-
tions, particularly of officials who collude in the trafficking, of 
parents who sell their daughters, or of buyers.184  Moreover, be-
cause many peasants regard wife-buying as normal, they usu-
ally sympathize with the buyer, often to the point of helping 
him keep his new wife imprisoned.185  As Liu Bohong, a Beijing 
social worker, noted, “Local people will defend the man who 
buys a wife….Everyone sympathizes with him.”186   Escape is 
extremely difficult.  Families of abducted women usually have 
no idea where their daughter has gone, and paying an investi-
gator to find and rescue her costs about $500, or ten years of a 
rural family’s income.187 
G. Resurgence of Bride Price in Marriage Transactions 
The scarcity of women has altered the economics of marriage 
in another way:  the resurgence of the bride price as an element 
of marriage brokering.188   While the sale of women was permit-
ted as late as 1906, the practice was eventually eradicated alto-
gether by the Communist Party.189  In fact, under the Marriage 
Law, the “exaction of money and gifts in connection with the 
marriage” is prohibited.190  Despite the prohibition, the payment 
  
were 32,679 abducted women living in one county, most of them trafficked 
from other provinces). 
 183. Report on CEDAW, supra note 12, at 7 (stating that the government 
severely restricts reporting on trafficking, making it difficult to expose en-
forcement deficiencies). 
 184. Id. at 19.  See also Schauble, supra note 178 (noting that Professor 
Hong Daode, of the University of Political Science and Law of China, com-
mented that Chinese law targeted kidnappers, “but did not adequately punish 
buyers”). 
 185. KRISTOF & WUDUNN, supra note 117, at 216 (For example, when a 
woman sold to a Shaanxi peasant tried to escape, she was tied to the bed.  The 
second time, the peasant beat her, and the third time, “he gouged out her 
eyes.”). 
 186. Elliot, supra note 173.  See also KRISTOF & WUDUNN, supra note 117, at 
216 (noting that local peasants often erect barricades to keep authorities out 
of their village). 
 187. Rosenthal, Harsh Chinese Realities, supra note 177. 
 188. Id.  
 189. Spahn, supra note 7, at 277. 
 190. MARRIAGE LAW (REVISED), supra note 33, art. 3. 
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of a bride price never completely faded out of practice,191 and the 
gender gap created by the OCP has caused a rapid increase in 
the bride price in the past few years.192  Bride prices have in-
creased tenfold, from “ten (10) to forty (40) percent of the aver-
age net income of a rural family…to sixty-three (63) to one hun-
dred eight-nine (189) percent of the average net family in-
come….”193   
Bride prices were outlawed primarily because they hindered 
the achievement of gender equality.194  A woman was essentially 
sold to the groom’s family and the bride price served as compen-
sation to her family for her upbringing.195  The reemergence of 
the ancient practice of selling women reflects the view of women 
as commodities196 to be traded for cash or even livestock.197  Ru-
ral women are increasingly becoming willing participants in 
their own sale, seeing it as an opportunity to mitigate their 
families’ poverty.198  Because of serious gaps in China’s legal 
framework, a woman’s willingness to participate in her own 
sale de-criminalizes the sale.  Although the trafficking of 
  
 191. See, e.g., MOSHER, supra note 4, at 150–51.  Even after the Communist 
Revolution, bride prices were extracted from the families of grooms.  Chi An 
explained: 
It was custom in China for the bride to ask the groom’s family to buy 
her presents.  The traditional bride price was six or nine ounces of 
pure gold in the form of heavy earrings, bracelets, and rings.  Worn 
as jewelry during good times, they provided a hedge against famine 
during bad.  After the revolution the Party forbade the buying and 
selling of gold.  Now girls generally asked for the “three things that 
go round and the one that sounds,” namely, a bike, a sewing machine, 
a watch, and a radio.  Sometimes they also demanded the “forty-eight 
legs,” a household of furniture, the legs of which totaled forty-eight. 
Id.  
 192. Spahn, supra note 7, at 277. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Han, supra note 105, at 798 (explaining that the extraction of bride 
price from the groom’s family led to “‘mercenary marriages’ where women, 
especially from poor families, were bought and sold as commodities”). 
 195. Id. at 793 (noting that “marriage meant that females became legally 
divorced from their birth families”).  
 196. Id.  Goff, supra note 9. 
 197. See, e.g., KRISTOF & WUDUNN, supra note 117, at 212 (recounting the 
story of an unmarried peasant buying a mentally retarded woman from a wife 
dealer with a calf, and then allowing her to die of starvation and exposure 
over the next winter). 
 198. Goff, supra note 9. 
File: Skalla.122704.doc Created on: 12/27/2004 2:04 PM Last Printed: 12/27/2004 2:05 PM 
2004] CHINA'S ONE-CHILD POLICY 355 
women by third parties is criminalized under Chinese law, such 
sales are not illegal when the transactions are completed by the 
women or their families.199    These marriages are still illegal, 
and thus unregistered, but neither the women and their fami-
lies, nor the bridegrooms, face criminal repercussions.200   
H. Effect of Non-Registration 
The social and economic implications of the OCP for children 
are far-reaching.201  Those children born “out-of-plan” have no 
legal identity in China.202  In the 1950s, the government created 
the household registration system, which “provide[s] a record of 
births, deaths, marriages, and changes in the household compo-
sition.”203  Unauthorized children cannot be registered as legal 
residents, and are thus unable to obtain official documentation 
of their existence, including birth certificates and passports.204  
Some regions of China allow couples to register unauthorized 
children for a fee of anywhere from $600 to $2,400 per child.205  
But as a department head at the State Family Planning Com-
mission said, “There are two types of people for whom fees are 
ineffective: the richest, who just pay them and don’t care, and 
the poorest, who can’t pay them and don’t care.”206   
This deprivation of benefits to unauthorized children is also a 
case of conflicting legal enforcement.207  For example, the 1994 
Maternal and Infant Health Care Law (MIHCL) promises that 
the state will “provide essential conditions and material assis-
tance to the development of undertakings for maternal and in-
  
 199. Spahn, supra note 7, at 278–79. 
 200. Id. (noting that unregistered marriages are unlawful even if both par-
ties freely consent to the union).   
 201. Unfair Burdens, supra note 13.   
 202. Report on CEDAW, supra note 12, at 89. 
 203. Zhang, supra note 72, at 565.   
 204. Unfair Burdens, supra note 13.  See also Xicheng, supra note 96 (noting 
that “black children” are unable to obtain passports). 
 205. Elizabeth Rosenthal, Rural Flouting of One-Child Policy, supra note 69 
(observing that fees vary widely by region).   
 206. Id.  See also Report to CEDAW, supra note 12, at 89–90 (A slogan on a 
wall in rural Hubei Province encapsulates the discrimination suffered by poor 
families and their unauthorized children: “The family wealth of those having 
children out-of-plan should all be lost.  The families of those having children 
out-of-plan should be broken up and dispersed.”). 
 207. Li, supra note 18, at 171. 
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fant health care.”208 Yet the law is not enforced because its pro-
visions conflict with the penalties imposed by the OCP, a higher 
priority for the government.209  The Marriage Law (revised) also 
aims to protect children by requiring that they all enjoy the 
same rights, including those of education and support, but it 
mitigates those rights by providing that other laws concerning 
illegal acts in the marriage and family shall prevail over the 
Marriage Law.210  Accordingly, the provisions of the Family 
Planning Law prevail, including its policy of punishing parents 
for having unauthorized children by withholding their registra-
tion.211 
Registration cards are required for claiming state subsidies, 
health care and admission to day care.212  Therefore, unregis-
tered children, referred to as “hei haizi” or “black children,” do 
not qualify for government subsidies, which include education, 
health care, pension and many forms of employment.213  Without 
a residence card, these children become part of the floating mi-
grant population, doomed to work at low-paying jobs that are 
often outside the protection of China’s labor laws.214   Moreover, 
the government often uses registration benefits as a stick to 
enforce provisions of the OCP.215  For example, in Fujian prov-
ince, women who refuse to use IUDs lose grain rations and 
medical benefits for their first child, regardless of whether the 
child’s birth was authorized.216 
The floating population is rising in China, with conservative 
estimates placing this migrant population at approximately 150 
  
 208. MATERNAL AND INFANT HEALTH CARE LAW art. 2, English version, at 
http://www.isinolaw.com.   
 209. Li, supra note 18, at 171. 
 210. MARRIAGE LAW (REVISED), supra note 33, arts. 25, 49. 
 211. See Li, supra note 18, at 171. 
 212. Unfair Burdens, supra note 13. 
 213. Xicheng, supra note 96.  See also Abrams, supra note 69 (A 15-year-old 
girl was recently granted asylum in the U.S. because as an unauthorized child 
she was denied access to education and her family had been extensively fined 
merely because of her existence.); Noonan, supra note 50. 
 214. See, e.g., KRISTOF & WUDUNN, supra note 117, at 214–16 (showing that 
women without residence permits are often forced to work in jobs where labor 
standards are low or where they are subject to pernicious forms of sexual har-
assment and molestation). 
 215. Gellman, supra note 48, at 1081.  
 216. Weisskopf, Abortion Policy, supra note 52. 
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million people.217  This migrant population, attributed to the 
emergence of China’s new market economy and an influx of ru-
ral laborers to urban commercial centers, has led to an erosion 
of the household registration system.218  Members of the floating 
population are not entitled to the benefits of the state, even if 
they are registered since Chinese citizens can only receive their 
state subsidies in their place of household registration.219  The 
floating population makes a sizeable contribution to the number 
of unregistered children, accounting for nearly one in eight 
births above the OCP quota.220   
While the birth rate is fairly low in urban areas, with most 
residents adhering to the OCP, in rural areas there is a growing 
number of unauthorized children.221  Census figures are notori-
ously poor at accounting for unregistered children, primarily 
because their parents hide them,222 but unannounced spot 
checks by the State Statistics Bureau have discovered under-
counts of up to 40 percent in some rural villages.223 For example, 
Guangdong’s Tanba township failed to report more than 2,000 
births; almost 80 percent of women in Xin village had three or 
more children.224  In rural areas, the number of children born 
third or later is often as high as 10.2 percent, compared to just 
one-tenth of one percent in cities like Beijing.  Almost all of 
these children are illegal, and will remain unregistered and un-
  
 217. Kane & Choi, supra note 91.  But see Rosenthal, Rural Flouting of One-
Child Policy, supra note 69 (Susan Greenhalgh, professor at University of 
California at Irvine, said, “My sense is that nobody knows the actual popula-
tion of the People’s Republic of China . . . . [a]nd that makes it impossible to 
engage in the economic and social planning that China needs to do.”). 
 218. Zhang, supra note 72, at 565. 
 219. See generally MOSHER, supra note 4.  See also Kane & Choi, supra note 
91 (noting that migrants earn cash wages, are seldom eligible for state ser-
vices, and do not draw attention to themselves by trying to obtain temporary 
registration, the result being a decline in the reliability of population statis-
tics). 
 220. Zhang, supra note 72, at 566. 
 221. Rosenthal, Rural Flouting of One-Child Policy, supra note 69. 
 222. Unfair Burdens, supra note 13 (noting that unregistered children are 
overwhelmingly female, as parents hide them in order to try for the coveted 
son).  See also Rosenthal, Rural Flouting of One-Child Policy, supra note 69 
(commenting that after 20 years of the OCP, hiding children from the state 
has become second nature in many parts of China). 
 223. Rosenthal, Rural Flouting of One-Child Policy, supra note 69.  
 224. Id. 
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educated.225  Sadly, the very factors that perpetuate the abduc-
tion and trafficking of women are perpetuated by the state’s 
failure to register its illegal children.  Poverty and lack of edu-
cation often make women vulnerable to trafficking,226 yet their 
children must suffer the same fate because they have no legal 
identity. 
IV. RELEVANT LAWS AND TREATIES 
A. Marriage Law 
Under the traditional Confucian hierarchical structure, a 
marriage was preeminently a contract227 and “usually the result 
of an agreement between two families, not two individuals.”228  
Divorce proceedings, usually initiated by the husband, came 
about in much the same way.229  Women had no choice in their 
marriage or divorce, and lacked economic independence.230  Nei-
ther Chinese law nor Chinese culture provided any protection 
for women until the advent of Communism.231 
Although the 1950 Marriage Law never became well known, 
it introduced the concept of marriage as an individual choice, a 
contract that must be entered into “without any interference or 
obstruction from third parties.”232  Even though it essentially 
outlawed child marriages and forced marriages, arranged mar-
riages were still common.233  By contrast, the 1980 Marriage 
Law was highly publicized even though the differences between 
the two laws were slight.234  While the 1980 law affirmed the 
right of free choice in marriage, it also included rules on inheri-
  
 225. Id. 
 226. China: Poverty ‘Breeds’ Woman Trafficking, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 1, 2002. 
 227. See Ruskola, supra note 101, at 1642–43. 
 228. Janice A. Lee, Family Law of the Two Chinas: A Comparative Look at 
the Rights of Married Women in the People’s Republic of China and the Repub-
lic of China, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 217, 223 (1997). 
 229. Id. at 224 (arguing that suicide was  a wife’s only escape from a bad 
marriage). 
 230. Id. (noting that divorce was a calamity for Chinese women because of 
their lack of economic independence). 
 231. Id. at 226–27. 
 232. Han, supra note 105, at 798. 
 233. Lee, supra note 228, at 238 (noting that many wives still resorted to 
suicide as a way to escape unhappy marriages). 
 234. Id. at 239. 
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tance, family planning, adoption and support obligations of ex-
tended family.235  Nevertheless, the law remained silent as to 
invalid marriages, failing to establish a system of regulation for 
invalid and revocable marriages.236 
The revised Marriage Law, which became effective in 2001, 
differed significantly from the 1980 Marriage Law in that it es-
tablished rules regarding invalid and revocable marriages.  Ac-
cording to Article 8, a marriage is not established until it has 
been registered.237  Under China’s Marriage Law, there are sev-
eral ways to make a marriage invalid.  For example, the exac-
tion of monies, i.e., bride price, would nullify the marriage,238 as 
would failure to register it.239  Moreover, women trafficked in 
violation of Chinese law, or those who are forced into marriage, 
may request revocation of their unions, essentially invalidating 
them.240  Because the marriages would be invalid, none of these 
couples would be eligible for birth permits, and thus all of these 
children would be unregistered.241   
While Article 10 provides circumstances in which a marriage 
is invalid,242 Article 11 allows a party to request revocation of 
the marriage when it is based upon intimidation.243  Article 12 
complicates matters, however.  Although an invalid or revoked 
marriage is completely invalid, parents of children born to these 
invalid unions have the same responsibilities to their children 
as do parents in valid marriages.244  In actuality, however, par-
ents of children born to invalid unions have greater responsi-
bilities because although Article 25 states that “[c]hildren born 
  
 235. Han, supra note 105, at 799. 
 236. Xiaoqing Feng, A Review of the Development of Marriage Law in the 
People’s Republic of China, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 331, 333 (2002). 
 237. MARRIAGE LAW (REVISED), supra note 33, art. 8. 
 238. Id. art. 12. 
 239. Feng, supra note 236, at 349 (noting that de facto marriages are inva-
lid). 
 240. MARRIAGE LAW (REVISED), supra note 33, art. 11. 
 241. Report on CEDAW, supra note 12, at 89. 
 242. MARRIAGE LAW (REVISED), supra note 33, art. 10 (stating that marriages 
shall be invalid for bigamy, prohibited relative relationships, where a party is 
unfit because of disease, and where either party is younger than the legal 
marriage age).  
 243. Id. art. 11 (intimidated parties must request revocation within one 
year of marriage registration or within one year of gaining their personal 
freedom). 
 244. Id. art. 12. 
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out of wedlock shall enjoy the same rights as children born in 
wedlock,” it also provides that the parents shall bear all of the 
child’s living and educational expenses.245  Because the state 
typically assumes the burden of health and education expenses, 
the Marriage Law places both the parents and the children of 
invalid marriages at a distinct disadvantage.   
Another dilemma not entirely solved by the revised Marriage 
Law is the validity of de facto marriages.  A de facto marriage is 
one that meets the formal requirements of the Marriage Law 
and is not otherwise invalid, but has not been registered.  The 
general rule is that de facto marriages are not legally binding.246  
Discussions surrounding revisions to the Marriage Law, how-
ever, imply that de facto marriages are revocable, but not inva-
lid.247  Therefore, if the cohabiting couple obtains a marriage 
certificate prior to revocation, the union will be valid.248   
In rural areas, de facto marriages may include sixty to sev-
enty percent of total marriages, with parties lacking either the 
intent or the monetary means to register their union.249  This 
lack of registration has serious consequences for family plan-
ning;250 parties to an unregistered marriage cannot obtain birth 
permits and, thus, any children of these unions are illegal and 
unregistered.   
B. Family Planning Law 
The Family Planning Law, which essentially codifies the 
OCP, only became effective in December of 2001.251  Prior to its 
promulgation, implementation of the OCP was spelled out by 
government directives and carried out by local officials.252  Some 
commentators see the new law as a landmark in China’s im-
plementation of the OCP because it demonstrates the govern-
ment’s recognition of the implicit gender problems created by 
the OCP and is the first national attempt to address gender is-
  
 245. Id. art. 25. 
 246. Feng, supra note 236, at 348–49.   
 247. Id. at 349. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 346. 
 250. Id. at 347. 
 251. See generally FAMILY PLANNING LAW, supra note 36. 
 252. See Li, supra note 18, at 152. 
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sues on family planning.253  For example, Article 22 prohibits 
discrimination and abandonment of female babies and their 
mothers while Article 35 prohibits sex selection and use of ul-
trasound technology for anything other than medical pur-
poses.254 
Nevertheless, the Family Planning Law does not change the 
essential elements of the OCP, namely a commitment to birth 
quotas and local implementation.255  Moreover, much of the law 
is focused on the socioeconomic justifications for implementa-
tion of the OCP, not specific enforcement measures for it.256  
Most important, however, China’s adoption of the Family Plan-
ning Law signifies China’s continued commitment to the OCP.257  
China’s previous failure to adopt a national law was seen as a 
convenient way to divert international criticism.  The law’s 
adoption, according to a panel member involved in the its draft-
ing, demonstrates that family planning is now widely ac-
cepted.258   
V.  LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Legal Ramifications 
While the provisions of the Family Planning Law take prece-
dent over the Marriage Law,259 both laws require societal re-
spect for the rule of law and a sound legal infrastructure to en-
sure enforcement and protection of promised legal rights.260  Yet, 
the primary problem with implementation of the OCP has been 
the state’s failure to adequately protect women and children.261  
These problems have not been alleviated since the adoption of 
the Family Planning Law.   In fact, the unintended conse-
quences of the OCP—gender discrimination, a woman shortage, 
and trafficking—may be exacerbated by strict enforcement of 
either the Family Planning Law or the Marriage Law.   
  
 253. Hui, supra note 30, at 200. 
 254. FAMILY PLANNING LAW, supra note 36, arts. 22, 35. 
 255. See id. arts. 6, 7, 9, 12, 18. 
 256. See id. arts. 1, 2, 24, 25. 
 257. Hui, supra note 30, at 200. 
 258. Id.  
 259. MARRIAGE LAW (REVISED), supra note 33, art. 49. 
 260. Hui, supra note 30, at 204. 
 261. See generally Report on CEDAW, supra note 12. 
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Strict enforcement of the Family Planning Law could include 
stricter sanctions and increase the number of sex-selective 
abortions.  On the other hand, strict enforcement of the Mar-
riage Law could have serious consequences for China’s next 
generation.  Not only will unplanned births or unregistered 
children be unable to reap the benefits of the state,262 but chil-
dren theoretically falling within the OCP guidelines would be 
unregistered because of their parents’ invalid marriages.  More-
over, strict enforcement of the Marriage Law could force victims 
of trafficking to remain with their buyers because by revoking 
their marriages, these trafficked women would be forcing their 
children to be unregistered. 
B. Possible Solutions 
While enforcement of the OCP has created a wide range of so-
cial, cultural and gender-related problems, China’s recent adop-
tion of the Family Planning Law reflects its long-term commit-
ment to the policy.263  Although the most effective solution would 
be a relaxation of the policy, that does not seem likely consider-
ing China’s population problem and the shortage of relatively 
speedy, economical solutions.264  While some commentators ar-
gue that public family planning education would eventually 
effectuate China’s population goals, the reality is that it would 
not do so quickly enough to forestall the economic consequences 
of a baby boom in China. 
Instead, China should focus on a reconstruction of its Mar-
riage Law and amendments to its Family Planning Law.  The 
largest hidden problem with the OCP is its effect on future gen-
erations, an effect that China could feel economically.  By fail-
ing to register a large number of its children because of their 
unauthorized status, China is dooming them to an inferior exis-
tence.  To begin, China could amend its Marriage Law so that 
children born out of wedlock and to invalid marriage arrange-
ments, including de facto marriages, would not be unauthor-
ized.  In order for this change to be effective, however, China 
would also need to amend its Family Planning Law and prohibit 
the withholding of registration as a punishment for children 
  
 262. Unfair Burdens, supra note 13. 
 263. See generally Hui, supra note 30. 
 264. Zhang, supra note 72, at 593. 
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born out-of-plan.  Moreover, China should give its Marriage 
Law equal weight and forbear valuing family planning over the 
rights and obligations of parents to their children.  Finally, in 
order for China to demonstrate its commitment to human rights 
and gender equality, it must develop a comprehensive legal 
structure for enforcement of its prohibitions against trafficking 
and coercive family planning techniques.  Without true en-
forcement of these prohibitions, as well as a crackdown on local 
corruption, China will be unable to garner popular support for 
the OCP or respect for the rule of law.   
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